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iv

Jurisdiction
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty on two misdemeanor counts,
Assault against a Peace Officer and Interference with an Arresting Officer. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e).

Controlling Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
The following provisions, copies of which are attached as Exhibit A, are
controlling:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4.

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305.

4.

U.S. Const, amend. VI.

5.

Utah Const., art. I, §12.

Summary of Argument
At the trial of this matter, Defendant's counsel argued to the jury that the
Defendant's physical aggression against police officers was self-defense. The
jury heard the facts and the judge's instructions regarding self-defense, and in
turn found the Defendant guilty of two counts. Unsatisfied with the jury's
interpretation of the facts presented, Defendant, without properly marshaling the
evidence, now presents his self-defense arguments to this Court in the guise of
1

an ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error argument. Nevertheless,
Defendant's assertion that he was denied his constitutional rights as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as his assertion that the district court
committed plain error in not granting a directed verdict sua sponte, is erroneous.
Under neither argument can Defendant show that he would have been entitled to
a directed verdict, whether by counsel's motion following the state's case-in-chief,
or by the court's own initiative prior to submitting the case to the jury.
Accordingly, the requisite prejudice can not be shown. Defendant's convictions
for Assault against a Peace Officer and Interference with Arresting Officer should
be affirmed.

I.

Defendant Has Not Fulfilled His Obligation to Marshal the Evidence.
This Court has adopted the "marshal the evidence" standard in criminal

appeals from jury verdicts where the sufficiency of the evidence is in issue. State
v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Moore, this Court noted,
"The process of marshaling the evidence serves the important function of
reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact
finder at trial. Such deference is especially appropriate where the fact finder is a
jury, whose common sense is a valued buffer between the parties." jd.
(Emphasis added.) This Court has further explained, "It is well established that a
defendant's burden on appeal when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
2

after a jury trial is to '"marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict."'" State v. Rudolph. 2000 UT App 155,1J18, 3 P.3d 192.
(Citations omitted.)(Emphasis added.)
In his memorandum, Defendant acknowledges his obligation to marshal the
evidence in support of the jury verdict. (Br. of Appellant at 21.) However, he
proceeds to recite the interpretation of the facts that Defendant advocated all
along through the trial - that Officer Carr attacked the Defendant and was solely
responsible for the ensuing altercation. For example, in his recitation of the
evidence, Defendant ignored or brushed aside the significance of the officer's
testimony regarding his training in dealing with domestic violence situations, as
well as how to reach under the circumstances he faced. (R. at 109/67, 71.)
Defendant also ignores Officer Panter's testimony as to the Defendant's profane
verbal threats after being taken into custody. (R. at 109/106-07.) Further,
Defendant only mentions the profane threats made to Officer Carr subsequent to
his recitation of the sequence of events, so as to construe the evidence in a light
most favorable to the defense.
Throughout the brief, Defendant repeats his argument that he "was simply
trying to get away from two very aggressive police officers." (Br. of Appellant at
18.) Defendant made this same argument at trial, that Officer Carr stepped over
the line. (R. at 109/171-72.) However, Defendant makes no attempt to marshal
3

the evidence in the proper light. No effort has been made to show anything other
than the defendant's interpretation of the facts, which was already rejected by the
jury. The Defendant having failed to marshal the evidence with regards to his
ineffective assistance and plain error claims, his assertions of error should be
disregarded.

II.

Defendant Was Not Denied His Constitutional Rights By Virtue of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
A.

Defendant Has the Burden of Establishing Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel.

Defendant's assertion that his constitutional right to counsel has been
impaired must be evaluated in light of the two part test established by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under this test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. This test has also been adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court with reference to determinations of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See, ag,, State v. Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, fl27, 94 P.3d 186;
Accord, State v. Diaz. 2002 UT App 288, P 8 , 55 P.3d 1131. Reviewing courts
4

employ a presumption that assistance has been adequate. Strickland. 466 U.S.
at 689. Moreover, the Defendant must establish a reasonable probability that but
for counsel's professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. ]d. at 694. Absent a showing of prejudice, an ineffective assistance
claim necessarily fails. See, e.g., State v. Pirela. 2002 UT App 39,1J25, 65 P.3d
307 (holding, based on Strickland, that where it is easier to dispose of an
ineffective assistance claim based on lack of prejudice, that course should be
followed.)
Defendant appears to suggest in his brief, given the "general practice"
amongst defense counsel in criminal trials, that his counsel's performance was
deficient per se solely for his failure to move for a directed verdict following the
state's case in chief. (Br. of Appellant at 14.) However, while Defendant correctly
points the Court to one occasion where a conviction was overturned for failure to
seek a directed verdict,1 this Court has frequently rejected out of hand ineffective
assistance claims predicated upon failure to seek a directed verdict. See, e.g..
State v. Shephard. 2004 UT App 448, 2004 WL 2697462; State v. Valdez. 2004
UT App 366, 2004 WL 2361822; State v. Zampedri. 2004 UT App 348, 2004 WL
2251146; State v. O'Brien. 2003 UT App 419, 2003 WL 22862190; State v.
Munford. 2003 UT App 279, 2003 WL 21805346; State v. Reves. 2000 UT App
1

See. State v. Smith. 2003 UT App 52, 65 P.3d 648. In Smith, unlike this
case, the state failed to present evidence as to a key element such that a motion
for a directed verdict was warranted, id. at 1(31-32.
5

310, 2000 WL 33249925;2 Tillman v. Cook. 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah
1993)(holding failure to raise motion to dismiss not ineffective where there was
sufficient evidence to support the charges).

B.

The State Produced Sufficient Evidence for a Prima Facie Case,
Which Precluded a Directed Verdict in Defendant's Favor.

A defense counsel's failure to raise a futile motion does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. See, State v. Kellev. 2000 UT 41, fl26, 1 P.3d
546; State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96,1J34, 989 P.2d 52. In this case, had
Defendant's counsel moved for a directed verdict, it would have been futile
because the state produced sufficient evidence of the elements of the crimes
charged. As a result, counsel's performance was not deficient, and in turn,
Defendant suffered no prejudice by his counsel's failure to move for a directed
verdict.
To support its charges the state was required to show, under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
2

Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 30(f), copies of the foregoing unpublished
decisions of this Court are attached as Exhibit B for reference of the Court and
counsel.
6

In addition, the state was required to show that Officer Carr was a peace officer
acting within the scope of his authority, and that Defendant knew he was a peace
officer. See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4. If the state has produced "believable
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged," a motion for directed verdict
should be denied. State v. Montova. 2004 UT 5, fl29, 84 P.3d 1183.
In his testimony, Officer Carr testified that the Defendant stated he had a
knife and went to reach for it. Officer Carr grabbed his wrist when he proceeded
to reach for it and advised him to keep his hands out. (R. at 109/71.)3 The
Defendant then pulled his hand out aggressively with the knife in his hand.
Notwithstanding Defendant's resistance, Officer Carr secured the knife. (R. at
109/71.) Defendant had his fist clenched and was looking back at Officer Carr.
Officer Carr inquired as to what was in the hand - and eventually told the
Defendant to drop whatever it was. The Defendant did not comply. (R. at
109/72.)
Officer Carr tried to secure Defendant because of his clenched right fist
and the Defendant progressed towards Officer Carr forcing him to spin around
backwards. At that point, according to Officer Carr, "he immediately began to
fight me." He testified that it happened quickly but that he was in a physically
demanding position. Officer Carr was trying to gain control over the Defendant,
3

Officer Carr further indicated that his actions were justified by the volatile
nature of the domestic violence call and his training in how to react to similar
situations. (R. at 109/67, 71.)
7

but the fight continued. (R. at 109/73.) Meanwhile, the Defendant was shouting
profanities at Officer Carr, including the paraphrased threat, "I'm going to F-ing
kick your F-ing A if you don't let me go." The Defendant was also pushing away
from the wall to gain mobility against Officer Carr, and the altercation continued.
(R. at 109/74.) Throughout this, the family was interfering in Officer Carr's efforts
to restrain the Defendant. (R. at 109/75.) Eventually, Officer Mackley came in to
assist. (R. at 109/76.) In his efforts, Officer Carr offered Defendant to pull his
arm down if he would stop resisting and put it behind his back. Instead, the
Defendant sucked this arm underneath his chest making the officer's attempts to
secure him more difficult. (R. at 109/76.) Shortly thereafter, the Defendant
looked over his shoulder and elbowed Officer Mackley in the chin and face. (R.
at 109/77; 100.) Following the fight, Officer Carr had an abrasion on his elbow
and pain in his right shoulder. (R. at 109/78.)
Even after the Defendant was put under control and taken to the hospital to
be attended to, Defendant was threatening the transporting officers that he would
"kick [their] fucking asses" and that "he could take on any pig out there." He
indicated his hope to meet the officers on the street. (R. at 109/106.)
In this case, with the reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the state,4
Officer Carr was at Defendant's home to investigate a report of a family fight.
Defendant instigated a fight upon Officer Carr's attempts to restrain him in the
4

See, Montova. at 1J29.
8

course of the investigation. He used unlawful force leaving Officer Carr in "a
physically demanding position." He drew out the confrontation with Officer Carr
leaving him with abrasions and pain in the shoulder, all the while shouting out
threats with profanity. Furthermore, the Defendant elbowed Officer Mackley in
the face, and continued with his treats after being taken for treatment when the
fight was controlled by officers. These facts are sufficient to create believable
evidence supporting any of the three definitions of assault under the statute. The
jury further heard testimony that Officer Carr was on duty, and called to
investigate the circumstances at Defendant's home. (R. at 109/66.)
Given that there was believable evidence as to all of the elements of
Assault on a Police Officer,5 defense counsel had no obligation to move for a
directed verdict. Any such motion would have lacked merit, and would have
accordingly been futile. As such, Defendant has not been denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel.

III.

The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error in Not Dismissing the
Charges Against Defendant Sua Sponte.
Just as in his ineffective assistance claim, Defendant repeats that the trial

defendant raises no argument as to the lack of believable evidence
regarding Count II, for which he was also convicted. Moreover, the testimony of
the officers also was sufficiently believable evidence that the Defendant
committed the crime of Interference With Arresting Officer under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-305.

9

court's failure to sua sponte dismiss the state's charges based on his self defense
arguments was plain error. A defendant seeking to establish plain error must
show (1) an error exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court,
and (3) the error is harmful, or undermines confidence in the court's verdict. See,
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (1993). Defendant has not established plain
error under this test.
Indeed, if any element of the plain error test is not established, there has
been no plain error. See, State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994),
citing. Dunn, at 1209. In this case, there was no error in the first place under the
first prong of the test. As set forth above, in its case, the state produced
believable evidence to support a conviction for Assault on a Peace Officer.
Afterwards, Defendant principally called two witnesses, Ronald Webster
and Ronna White, the Defendant's father-in-law and wife respectively. Ronald
Webster opined that an officer had thrown his son against the wall and
purposefully damaged family pictures. (R. at 109/127.) Ronna White also was
called to testify that Officer Carr had slammed Defendant into a wall. (R. at
109/143.)6
6

The credibility of both of Defendants' witnesses were undermined on cross
examination. Ronald Webster testified that the officer present in court, Officer
Carr, had not been the one to allegedly come after the Defendant. (R. at
109/135). Nor did he mention his claims of police violence in his written
statement to police. (R. at 109/132-36). Likewise, Ronna White's testimony was
in direct conflict with her initial written statement to the police regarding the
episode. (R. at 109/147-51). These statements are attached as Exhibit C.
10

Notwithstanding this testimony, whether Defendant was entitled to a
directed verdict at the close of testimony depends on whether, viewed in the light
most favorable to the state, a prima facie case had been established of the
elements of the crime charged. Montova. at fl29. Through the testimony
highlighted in the previous section, the state produced believable testimony from
Officers Carr, Mackley, and Panter that Defendant had committed Assault on a
Peace Officer. The jury, as finder of fact, was free to weight the testimony and
make its own determination as to what testimony to believe or disbelieve. See.
State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604, 612 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Glauser Storage. L L C ,
v. Smedlev. 2001 UT App 141,1J24, 27 P.3d 565. The district court properly
submitted the question of Defendant's guilt to their consideration. There was no
error by the district court in not directing a verdict from the jury.
As set forth previously, Defendant's failure to establish the first prong is
sufficient basis alone to reject his claim of plain error. However, the other two
prongs likewise have not been established. Under the second prong, because
there was no error, failure to recognize the error could not have been obvious to
the trial court. Likewise, under the third prong, the absence of a directed verdict
from the trial court does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding. A jury of the Defendant's peers heard all of the evidence and was
properly instructed regarding the elements of the crimes charged.7 The jury
defendant raises no challenge to the sufficiency of the instructions given.

11

acquitted the Defendant of Counts Three and Five, regarding simple assault and
intoxication. However, the strength and adequacy of the state's evidence is
manifest by the jury's guilty verdict with regards to Count One and Two. (R. at
80.) The jury clearly scrutinized the facts, acquitting Defendant where they
deemed appropriate, and convicting where they found sufficient evidence.
Accordingly, there was no harm to Defendant under the plain error test.

Conclusion
Defendant has not fulfilled his obligation to marshal the evidence in support
of the jury's verdict, and even had he done so, Defendant was not deprived of his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Defendant's counsel would
have been pursuing a futile motion in seeking a directed verdict at the close of the
state's case, and as such, his failure to so move was not ineffective. The state
produced believable evidence to establish its prima facie case of Assault on a
Peace Officer. For the same reason, there was no plain error in the judge's
failure to direct a verdict for Defendant sua sponte. The question of Defendant's
guilt was properly submitted to the jury on the evidence presented, and
Defendant was justly convicted.

12

DATED this

2U

day of May, 2005.

•>

Amy F. Hugie
Box Elder County Attorney
Brad C. Smith
Benjamin C Rasmussen
Deputy County Attorneys
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prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee, to the
following individuals:
Dee W. Smith
Randall W. Richards
Box Elder Public Defenders
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Exhibit A
Controlling Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

Controlling Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102:
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4:
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a
peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or another correctional
facility, a minimum of:
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense.
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required
under Subsection (2) if the court finds that the interests of justice would be best
served and makes specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the
record.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305:

A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing
any act that would impede the arrest or detention.

U.S. Const, amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Utah Const, art. I, §12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her

husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
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2004 WL 2697462 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 448
(Cite as: 2004 WL 2697462 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Dean Alan SHEPHARD, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20030235-CA.
Nov. 26, 2004.
Third District, Salt Lake
Honorable Sheila K. McCleve.

Department;

The

Margaret P. Lindsay, Orem, and Patrick V. Lindsay
, Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
THORNE, Judge:
*1 Defendant Dean Alan Shephard appeals his
conviction for possession or operation of a
clandestine laboratory in violation of Utah's
Clandestine Drug Lab Act (the Act). See Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37d-4 (2002). We affirm.
Shephard first argues that his conviction should be
reversed because the evidence of his connection to
the lab equipment was insufficient to prove a nexus.
Shephard presents an independent sufficiency of
the evidence argument and an argument that the
trial court committed plain error by failing to
dismiss the case sua sponte. However, Shephard's
failure to preserve his sufficiency of the evidence

argument eliminates his opportunity to argue
sufficiency on traditional grounds and limits his
available argument to challenging the trial court's
inaction. See generally State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74,fl 11-14, 10P.3d346.
"As a general rule, to ensure that the trial court
addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, a
defendant must request that the court do so....
[W]hen a defendant fails to make such a motion"
the trial court is under no duty to examine the
evidence. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,ffl[ 14-16,
10 P.3d 346. However, "there is a certain point at
which an evidentiary insufficiency is so obvious and
fundamental that it would be plain error for the trial
court not to discharge the defendant." Id. at f 17.
On appeal, we will conclude that such a point was
reached if, "after viewing the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
such that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he or she was convicted.' " Id at 1f
18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212
(Utah 1993)). But even if we find that this condition
has been met, we will not reverse unless we then
determine that "the evidentiary defect was so
obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to
submit the case to the jury." Id.
Shephard argues that the State's evidence failed to
establish any nexus or connection between
Shephard and the lab equipment. The Act prohibits
the actual or constructive possession of a controlled
substance precursor or laboratory equipment with
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4; State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987). To
prove constructive possession, there must be a
"sufficient nexus" between the accused and the
clandestine laboratory to permit an inference that
the accused had "both the power and the intent to
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exercise dominion and control over" the laboratory
materials. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,K 13, 985
P.2d 911 (quotations and citations omitted).

directed verdict would have been futile and
counsel's failure to make the motion does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Here, the State presented ample evidence
connecting Shephard to the illegal laboratory.
Police discovered a clandestine laboratory in the
garage of a house. Although he did not reside there,
Shephard was alone in the house when the police
arrived. The homeowner testified that a bicycle
found outside the garage containing the lab, a
backpack
containing
glassware
and
methamphetamine precursors, and a jacket found
near the lab all belonged to Shephard. Additionally,
the police found Shephard's fingerprint on both lab
glassware and a digital scale found in the home.
Police
officers
also
discovered
both
methamphetamine and a recipe for cooking
methamphetamine in the house. Finally, a witness
testified that he had visited the house to use
methamphetamine with Shephard and, if product
was available, to purchase methamphetamine from
him.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding
Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
2004 WL 2697462 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 448
END OF DOCUMENT

*2 After examining the evidence that was before
the trial court, we have no difficulty in concluding
that a reasonable jury could have determined that
Shephard was connected to the lab and responsible
for its operation. Consequently, Shephard's first
claim is without merit.
Shephard also argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to move for a directed verdict
based on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel,
Shephard must show that his counsel's performance
was objectively deficient and that counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant. See State v.
Kelley, 2000 UT 41,J 25, 1 P.3d 546 (quotations
and citations omitted). However "[fjailure to raise
futile objections does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel." Id. at If 26. We have
examined the State's evidence and can see no
possibility that a motion for a directed verdict
would have succeeded. See State v. Montoya, 2004
UT 5,f[ 28-29, 84 P.3d 1183 (reciting the
standard of review for the denial of a motion for a
directed verdict). Consequently, a motion for a
> 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
GREENWOOD, Judge:
*1 Defendant Tracy Valdez appeals the drug-free
zone enhancement of his conviction for possession
of methamphetamine, a second degree felony. See
Utah
Code
Ann.
§§
58-37-8(2)(a)(i),
(4)(a)(vi)-(vii), (4)(a)(ix) (Supp.2004). [FN1] We
affirm.
FN1. Although the legislature has amended
Utah Code section 58-37- 8 since
Defendant was charged, the amendment
does not affect the outcome of this case.
Therefore, for ease of reference, we cite to
the most recent version of the statute.
In support of his appeal Defendant presents two

arguments. First, Defendant asserts that the State's
evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to
convict him of the drug-free zone enhancement
based on proximity to a church. Second, he argues
that his counsel's failure to move for a directed
verdict constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. [FN2]
FN2. Defendant also challenges his
conviction on the grounds that the
shopping area near his arrest was not a
"shopping mall" under the terms of the
drug-free
zone enhancement penalty
statute. We decline to address this issue, as
a reasonable jury could have convicted the
defendant based on his proximity to the
two church properties while he was at the
apartment.
As to Defendant's first claim, because he did not
preserve an objection at trial to the trial court's
submission of the enhancement to the jury, and
because he did not allege any "procedural
anomalies or other exceptional circumstances,"
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,t 12, 10 P.3d 346,
that impeded such a preservation, we review his
claim under a plain error standard, with all
inferences viewed in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. See id at % 18.
Defendant asserts the trial court erred because the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
establish that he was in possession of a controlled
substance at the apartment where he was staying.
While Utah Code section 58- 37-8(2)(a)(i) makes
the possession of a controlled substance a second
degree felony, if the possession occurs within 1000
feet of a church, the penalty is enhanced to a first
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. §§
58-37-8(4)(a)(ix), (4)(b). Defendant concedes that
the apartment building was located less than 1000
feet from two church parking lots, but nevertheless
argues that the jury lacked sufficient evidence that
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he possessed any controlled substances while at or
leaving the apartment. Essentially, Defendant
asserts that he could have acquired the
methamphetamine during the thirty to forty-five
seconds that Officer Giles could not see him.
However, the jury could have reasonably based its
determination on the testimony of Officer Giles,
that Defendant could not have obtained the drugs in
the brief time he could not see Defendant. Hence,
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
conclusion. Accordingly, there was no error by the
trial court. Because the trial court did not err, the
defendant necessarily fails to establish plain error.

WE CONCUR: GREGORY K.
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.

ORME

and

2004 WL 2361822 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 366
END OF DOCUMENT

Second, Defendant asserts that his counsel's failure
to move for a directed verdict regarding the
drug-free zone enhancement penalty at the end of
the State's case in chief constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel we have consistently followed the United
States Supreme Court standard in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Thus, the
defendant has the burden to "show 'first, that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant.' " State v.
Kelley, 2000 UT 41,K 25, 1 P.3d 546 (quoting
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994))
(other quotation and citation omitted).
*2 Defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails
because he cannot show that he was prejudiced by
his attorney's failure to move for a directed verdict.
We have determined that the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to convict Defendant. Thus,
counsel's objection to the sufficiency of the
evidence would have properly been overruled by
the trial court. Defense counsel's failure to raise a
futile objection cannot be grounds for ineffective
assistance of counsel. See id. at f 26.
Accordingly, we affirm the jury's verdict and
Defendant's sentence.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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DAVIS, Judge:
*1 Albert Dennis Zampedri (Defendant) appeals
his convictions of attempted aggravated murder and
attempted murder. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that it could convict Defendant
of attempted aggravated murder and attempted
murder if it found that he committed either crime
"knowingly." Because Defendant's trial counsel did
not object to the instructions at issue, we will
review those instructions for error "only 'to avoid a
manifest injustice.' " State v. Powell, 872 P.2d
1027, 1029 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted); see Utah
R.Crim. P. 19(e) ("Unless a party objects to an

instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the
instruction may not be assigned as error except to
avoid a manifest injustice."). " '[I]n most
circumstances, the term "manifest injustice" is
synonymous with the "plain error" standard....' "
Powell, 872 P.2d at 1029 (citation omitted).
"[T]o establish the existence of plain error and to
obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that
was not properly objected to, the appellant must
show the following: (i)[a]n error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome
for the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined." ... [I]f any
one of those requirements is not met, plain error is
not established.
Id. at 1031 (first alteration in original) (citation
omitted). In Defendant's case, the challenged
instructions comported with the mens rea
requirements for both attempted aggravated murder
and attempted murder in effect at the time of the
incident and at the time he was charged, tried, and
convicted. As such, the alleged error could not "
'have been obvious to the trial court.' " Id (citation
omitted). Therefore, Defendant has not established
the existence of plain error. See id.
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request
that the trial court strike the term "knowingly" from
its instructions to the jury on attempted aggravated
murder and attempted murder. Because the
challenged instructions comported with the mens
rea requirements for both attempted aggravated
murder and attempted murder in effect at the time
of the incident and at the time Defendant was
charged, tried, and convicted, it would have been
futile for Defendant's trial counsel to request that
the trial court strike the term "knowingly" from
those instructions. Therefore, Defendant's trial
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counsel did not render ineffective assistance by
failing to make such a request. See State v. Wallace,
2002 UT App 295,H 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (stating that
" 'failure of counsel to make motions or objections
which would be futile if raised does not constitute
ineffective assistance'" (citation omitted)). [FN1]

WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding
Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
2004 WL 2251146 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 348
END OF DOCUMENT

FN1. In support of his first two arguments,
Defendant relies exclusively upon State v.
Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106.
However, Defendant makes no attempt to
explain why Casey is retroactively
applicable to his case. In addition,
Defendant fails to address whether the
legislature's recent amendment to the
attempt statute is retroactively applicable
to his case. Although the State addresses
the latter issue, we do not address either
issue because of Defendant's failure to
analyze them in his brief. See State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998)

Finally, Defendant argues that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support a
determination that he possessed the requisite mens
rea for either attempted aggravated murder or
attempted murder. Based upon this argument,
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to move for a
directed verdict, and that the trial court committed
plain error by failing to enter a directed verdict on
its own motion. After reviewing the record, we
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support a determination that Defendant possessed
the requisite mens rea, under the then-correct
instructions given to the jury, for both attempted
aggravated murder and attempted murder. Because
a motion for directed verdict would have been
futile, Defendant's counsel did not render
ineffective assistance by failing to make such a
motion. See id. Further, because the trial court did
not err by failing to enter a directed verdict on its
own motion, Defendant cannot, by definition,
establish the existence of plain error. See Powell,
872P.2datl031.
*2 Affirmed.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
*1 William King O'Brien appeals from a
conviction for attempted aggravated murder, a
first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated section 76-5-202 (Supp.2003). We
affirm.
O'Brien's conviction resulted from a high-speed
chase during which O'Brien, driving a vehicle
reported stolen and armed with a handgun,
attempted to escape police capture. O'Brien
contends that (1) the district court lacked sufficient
evidence to send the attempted aggravated murder
charge to the jury; and (2) the trial evidence was
insufficient to support O'Brien's conviction for
attempted aggravated murder of a police officer.

However, O'Brien's defense counsel failed to make
a motion for a directed verdict at trial to preserve
these sufficiency of the evidence claims for appeal.
See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,J 11, 10 P.3d
346; State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,f 18, 42
P.3d 1248. Thus, O'Brien challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence at trial by claiming ineffective
assistance of trial counsel in failing to move for a
directed verdict. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT
114,T[ 21 n. 2, 61 P.3d 1062 ("When a party fails
to preserve an issue for appeal, we will nevertheless
review the issue if the appealing party ... assert[s]
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to
preserve the issue."). Therefore, to dispose of
O'Brien's claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, we must first examine O'Brien's claims of
insufficiency of evidence.
"When evaluating whether the State produced
sufficient 'believable evidence' to withstand a
challenge at the close of the State's case in chief[
i.e., a motion for a directed verdict], we apply the
same standard used when reviewing a jury verdict."
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,1 41, 70 P.3d 111.
"Hence, [sufficient] evidence in this context means
the evidence must be 'capable of supporting a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id
(quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,1 15, 20 P.3d
300).
O'Brien argues that "[w]here the only evidence
presented against [him] is circumstantial, the
evidence supporting a conviction must preclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." State v.
Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986). "This is
because the existence of a reasonable hypothesis of
innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt." Id However, our supreme
court has held that this rule "is not controlling when
only part of the evidence is circumstantial." State v.
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976) (emphasis
added).
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Despite O'Brien's arguments to the contrary, the
record reflects that the State's case was not based on
circumstantial evidence alone. The State put on the
following direct and circumstantial evidence with
regard to the intent and substantial step elements of
the attempted aggravated murder charge: (1)
O'Brien was illegally armed with a handgun; (2)
police attempted to stop O'Brien while he was in
possession of a stolen vehicle; (3) O'Brien tried to
avoid capture by leading police on a high-speed
automobile chase; (4) O'Brien only stopped because
he lost control of his vehicle; (5) when O'Brien did
stop, a shot was fired from inside his vehicle; (6)
moments later O'Brien emerged from the wrecked
vehicle holding the handgun; (7) O'Brien again ran
from police, this time on foot; (8) once
apprehended, O'Brien sang a rap song about killing
"cops" with handguns; and (9) crime scene
investigators later found that a bullet apparently hit
the pursuing officer's windshield at approximately
throat level.
*2 Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that "
'the evidence to support the verdict was completely
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.' "
State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,1 10, 42 P.3d
1248 (quoting State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292,f
13, 13 P.3d 604). Therefore, we hold that
theevidence in this case was sufficient to survive a
motion for a directed verdict.
"The failure of counsel to make motions ... which
would be futile if raised does not constitute
ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,
1 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citation
omitted). Thus, we hold that O'Brien was not
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.

and

2003 WL 22862190 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App
419
END OF DOCUMENT
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(quoting State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813-14
(Utah 1977)). Accordingly, we must assume the
jury believed the testimony of the State's witnesses.
See Dunn, 850 P.2dat 1213.
Munford's burden is heightened in this instance
because he concedes that the issue of the sufficiency
of the evidence was not preserved in the trial court.
Therefore, he must demonstrate plain error. See
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1 13, 10 P.3d 346.
The requirements for plain error are that (1) error
exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. See id,
Munford argues on appeal that the State proved
only his presence at the homicide, not participation.
We disagree. The evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, demonstrates acts on
Munford's part that could be construed as
knowledge and participation, particularly in light of
Kiriluk's roommate's testimony that Munford was
present on at least one occasion where Kiriluk
indicated he was going to kill Brown. The
cumulative evidence was certainly not so
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained doubt.

PER CURIAM:
*1 "In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993).
"Appellant bears a heavy burden of establishing
'that the evidence is so inconclusive or insubstantial
that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime.' "
Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61,1 16, 52 P.3d 1169
(quoting State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168
(Utah 1980)). This court "will not 'substitute its
judgment for that of the fact finder.' " Id. (quoting
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)).
Further, this court "will not 'weigh conflicting
evidence [or] the credibility of witnesses.' " Id.

Munford also argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to move for a directed verdict
. However, because we determine that the evidence
was sufficient to support the jury verdict, it stands
to reason that a motion for a directed verdict
would have been unsuccessful and futile. "The
decision to forgo futile acts does not amount to
ineffective assistance." State v. Wallace, 2002 UT
App295,f27, 55P.3dll47.
The conviction is affirmed.
2003 WL 21805346 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App
279
END OF DOCUMENT
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*1 When a claim of ineffective assistance is raised
for the first time on appeal, we resolve the issue as a
matter of law. See State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177,
1179 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359
(Utah 1994). "Despite the application of a standard
normally bereft of deference, appellate review of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential;
otherwise, the 'distorting effects of hindsight' would
produce too great a temptation for courts to
second-guess trial counsel's performance on the
basis of an inanimate record." State v. Tennyson,
850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (citation
omitted).
Appellant does not show that there were witnesses
or counselors whom his attorney could have found
who would have offered favorable testimony.
Indeed, appellant admits that "it is ... a matter of
speculation, which witnesses may or may not have
assisted [him] in his defense." Appellant also failed

to make the alleged phone records part of the record
on appeal. "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be
a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).
Appellant does not demonstrate how counsel's
cross-examination strategy-which was basically to
have the child victim repeat her testimony,
including its inconsistencies—was deficient. Counsel
may well have concluded this low-key approach
would sit better with the jury than aggressive
cross-examination of a child. Accordingly, we
indulge the presumption that this approach was
sound trial strategy.
Both the Utah Criminal Code and the Utah Rules
of Evidence make it clear that a twelve-year-old
child is competent to be a witness. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-410 (1999); Utah R.Evid. 601. The
trial court did give a general instruction concerning
the jury's duty to assess each witness's credibility.
No specialized cautionary instruction concerning a
twelve-year-old's testimony is required by Utah law.
Appellant's counsel was, therefore, not deficient for
failing to request one.
None of the statements cited by appellant in his
brief constitute inadmissable hearsay under Utah
Rule of Evidence 801. As correctly set out in the
State's brief, appellant had already "manifested an
adoption or belief in [the] truth" of two of the
statements by admitting their substance in a written
statement to police and on the stand at trial. Utah
R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). The other statements were
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
but instead were offered for other purposes. See
Utah RJEvid. 801(c). [FN1]
FN1. It could be argued that defense
counsel should have objected to these
statements, even if they were not
technically hearsay, on the chance that the
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prosecutor might not have resisted or that
the trial court might otherwise have
sustained
the
objection.
However,
appellant's counsel may well have been
afraid that by objecting and having her
objection overruled, she would look
incompetent in the jury's eyes. Again,
where we can articulate "a rational basis
for counsel's performance," we presume
that counsel's conduct was pursuant to
sound trial strategy rather than ineptitude.
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468.
Appellant also claims his counsel was
ineffective for her failure to object to the
prosecution's repeated references to the
victim's age. This claim fails because
appellant has not shown how the
references to the victim's age, which was
never in dispute and was presumably
obvious to the jury, in any way prejudiced
his case.

END OF DOCUMENT

Appellant's claim that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to make a motion for directed verdict
succeeds only if the State's evidence was not
sufficient to support a conviction. Cf. Tillman v.
Cook 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993) (rejecting
ineffective assistance claim based on failure to
move to dismiss where evidence to convict was
sufficient), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994). The
claim fails because the facts viewed in the light
most favorable to the State show that appellant
broke into the eleven-year-old victim's room and
asked her to perform oral sex on him. This evidence
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
solicitation to commit sodomy on a child and to
send the case to the jury. The inconsistencies in the
victim's uncorroborated testimony were not
substantial enough to render the evidence
insufficient as a matter of law. See State v. Marcum,
750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988).
*2 Affirmed.
BENCH and DAVIS, JJ., concur
2000 WL 33249925 (Utah App.), 2000 UT App
310
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